I questioned aspects of that approach and argued that we invite more problems than we solve by offering less information and guidance to judges at sentencing. 11 This article is a call for more information to be made available to judges at sentencing.
The unjustified numbers and calculations in the Guidelines dominate the analysis and distract the court at sentencing.u The Sentencing Commission has never articulated on what basis it assigns a 2-level enhancement to another Sso,ooo in loss, the next 40 victims of a scheme, or for that matter, an additional 20 grams of heroin. Judge Rakoff rightly called the numbers in the Guidelines "unjustified" and "artificially infiated.''' 3 Yet, no information dictates the ultimate sentence imposed more than the numbers in the Guidelines. Information provided to the court about the individual qualities of the defendant and specific circumstances of the crime typically modify, and take a back seat to, the unsupported mathematics of the Guidelines.' 4 If the numbers and calculations in the Guidelines continue as the best information we provide to the court,' 5 then the sentencing goals of consistency and proportionality will be aspirational only, but not real.
The federal criminal justice system focuses more on who has the power to sentence than on why a specific sentence is fair in this case for this defendant. This article first argues that the focus on, and power struggle over, judicial discretion is misplaced. Neither granting judges increased discretion, nor Congress' next piece of sentencing legislation designed to restrict judicial discretion, improves the pro· cess, or outcomes, of federal sentencing.
Next, the Supreme Court mangled the process of federal sentencing. This article posits that if the judges are procedurally wed to the Guidelines, then we must improve the process in two ways. First, the Commission should phase out the numbers and calculations in the Guidelines, yet preserve the Guidelines' framework as the multifactor test for the Probation Office to describe in a Presentence Report. ' 6 Second, Probation should furnish the court with better, competing information to rival the Guidelines' numbers and calculations.' 7 Federal sentencing can achieve uniformity and proportionality by providing more meaningful, less unjustified information to district judges. Lastly, this article offers three broad classifications of material to better inform a district judge's discretion at sentencing: (r) "big data" designed to truly promote consistency and proportionality after Booker; (2) a searchable, comparable case database; and (3) contractual agreements or recommendations from the parties.
I. Struggling over Judicial Discretion, Instead of Informing It
The Booker Court restored sentencing discretion to federal district judges. The Court, however, saddled the district judge's process with the distracting and often misleading numbers and calculations supplied by the Guidelines. The numbers in the Guidelines are as arbitrary and unjustified after Booker as they were when mandatory. The Court, however, required that the sentencing court must calculate and consult the applicable guideline range for an offensein perpetuity. The process itself negatively affects judicial discretion.
The "calculate and consult procedure" of post-Booker federal sentencing appears to align with the sentencing Federal Sentencing Reporter. Vol. 26, No. I , pp. 28-34, ISSN 1053 -9867, electronic ISSN 1533 goals of uniformity and proportionality. 18 In the initial years immediately following Booker, a district judge may have benefited from consulting how a similarly situated defendant was sentenced from the mandatory guideline era. Today, eight years later, forcing a district judge to consider numbers and calculations from a twenty-year stretch in history has, and will continue to, become increasingly less helpful. By comparison, consider how infrequently, if ever, a judge imposing a sentence during the mandato:r;y guideline era referenced pre-Guidelines sentencing decisions to inform her decision. Interestingly, however, the bad marriage to the Guidelines and the need for better information at sentencing has not been the discussion in federal sentencing.
A. The Struggle to Control Sentencing Outcomes
Much of the debate in federal sentencing over the last forty years resembles a·tug-of.war over judicial discretion. Congress and the Sentencing Commission through its mandatory guidelines dictated sentencing outcomes in federal courts for nearly twenty years. Then the Supreme Court in Booker tugged the rope back over to favor judicial discretion. Congress now seeks to legislate new ways to tie the court's hands at sentencing.' 9 As imposed federal sentences continue to slide downward away from the once "applicable" guideline range, legislators inevitably will consider stepping in to reassert control. One of the few consistencies related to sentencing outcomes has been the power struggle to control them. When either side-either Congress and the Commission or the judiciary-gains an advantage in the struggle over sentencing power, other problems in the criminal justice system arise. On the one hand, Congress and the Commission fight to standardize sentencing results and curb judicial discretion. Yet, when we curb a district judge's discretion at sentencing with mandatory minimum sentences and prejudicial sentencing enhancements, the process reeks of rigidity and cannot properly incorporate individual and case-specific circumstances. No party in the federal criminal justice system~ven prosecutors-wants to return to the inflexibility of the mandatory guideline era.~0
On the other hand, district judges clamored for more discretion to tailor their decisions to individual circumstances and defendants. Yet, left unbounded, federal sentencing cannot achieve its goals of consistency and proportionality. District judges ascend from a spectrum of professional and personal experiences. For example, a significant percentage of district judges, who practiced and presided over criminal matters during the mandatory guideline era, may adhere more closely to Guideline sentences. The blind adherence could be habit, 21 but it could also indicate a judge's misplaced notions of consistency or a lack of information to better exercise her discretion. ~z Further, the workings of the federal criminal justice system break down when sentencing lacks predictability for the individual defendant. 
B. Neither More Judicial Discretion nor More Binding Legislation Assists the Process of Sentencing
Neither the judiciary's renewed discretion nor the prospect of more legislatively mandated sentences improves the process of sentencing. The sentencing judge merely reads a report about the crime and the individual defendant before imposing i!life-altering sentence. Legislators know even less about individual defendants when they propose legislation aimed at guaranteed sentencing outcomes.
The parties to a federal criminal case who know the most about the offense conduct and the offender-the defendant and prosecutor-inexplicably have the least input into the sentence imposed. ~4 Of the federal criminal cases charged, 90 percent or more end in guilty pleas. ~s
The procedural rule governing pleas provides for a recommendation from, or binding agreements of, the parties. 26 Yet, these provisions are severely underutilized. Joint party recommendations and binding agreements under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure n(c)(r) remain the rare exception, not the rule. Why? Because many district judges disfavor input from the parties, believing that binding agreements either invade their judicial discretion or reduce their role at sentencing to a rubber stamp. In the struggle over power to control sentencing, the process and the quality of the information provided to the court at sentencing have suffered. The information available to the district judge at sentencing is weak and outdated. Then it is organized under the Guidelines' distorted and unhelpful numbers and calculations, which dominate the court's attention. Technological advances and informational advancement have passed by, while the static, outdated report sent to chambers before sentencing remains largely unchanged. Elsewhere in industry~ven elsewhere in government-information is high-speed, on-demand, and optimized to the user's needs. When it comes to sentencing in federal court, judges might as well be carrying around a typewriter and white-out.
C. Current Information in a Presentence Report
To promote the sentencing goals of consistency and proportionality, the federal judiciary receives a thick Presentence Report (PSR) prepared by the U.S. Probation Office. PSRs contain a lot of information-far more information than may be provided to state, military, or other criminal judges imposing sentence. A typical PSR includes social work-type details about the individual defendant. It includes the case-related details which, especially in the more than 90 percent of cases resolved by guilty plea, are no more than recycled, factual summaries from investigative reports. 28 The only new information in PSRs comes from victim impact statements and letters from supporters. In a white-collar case, for example, the numerous paragraphs in a PSR broadly describe the defendant's role in the fraud scheme within a larger organization, the theory of loss, and the number of victims, from the perspective of the investigators. Then these paragraphs are modified by, and reduced to, a number-again, an unjustified, arbitrary number. For example, a +14 sentencing enhancement is applied for a loss amount of $866,ooo. When the judge reads the description, she cannot help but be instantly affected by the numerical modifier. Much like today's online reviews of products and services that reduce unending streams of information to "4-stars," "8o percent satisfied," and "thumbs down" ratings, the rating dwarfs the reasoning. The reader naturally reacts to the classification and the easily digestible number assigned more so than the underlying descriptions.
Congress empowered the Sentencing Commission to create the Sentencing Guidelines and report sentencing data back to Congress.
2 9 It also told Probation Offices to include calculations based on the applicable guidelines as part of the PSR. The Guidelines represent the most impactful math word problem anywhere in criminal law. However, these numbers and calculations, despite their importance, still lack justification.l 0 The Guidelines have always valued formulas, even unjustified formulas, over individuals and individual circumstances-and nothing has changed in the decade of post-Booker analysis. Section 2Br.1, the fraud guideline,l' possibly ranks as the most stark example. It treats individual sentencing outcomes like the estimated monthly payment spit-out of a mortgage calculator. The single overpowering factor of loss amount 32 and the stubborn adherence to "relevant conduct" weigh heavily against white-collar offenders. With the Guidelines, white-collar offenders evolved from the traditionally under-sentenced to the most consistently over-sentenced sector of federal defendants. The federal judiciary must improve the process of sentencing, and to do so, it needs other data and nonmathematical information so the Guidelines do not continue to have an overshadowing effect on sentencing determinations.
II. The Two Solutions
We can solve the procedural drawbacks of federal sentencing caused by the Booker court in two ways. The first way, while politically unlikely, is to retain the narrative section of the PSR that corresponds to the Guidelines provisions yet phase out the accompanying numbers and calculations. The second way, discussed in greater detail in Section III below, is to provide new, competing information to district judges at sentencing to rival the numbers and calculations of the Guidelines.
A. Phase Out the Numbers and Calculations of the

Guidelines
The federal government should phase out the numbers and calculations in the Guidelines. As opposed to scrapping them completely, the federal government should convert the Guidelines into factors that the court must consider. District judges could consult the Guidelines as specific factors to consider in individual cases. The numbers and calculations, however, have no sustainable utility. Modern district judges do not consider available sentencing data from the decades of sentences preceding the Guidelines, because most imposed sentences from the past eras are not helpful to judges imposing a sentence tomorrow.
Judge Rakoffhypothesized that with multifactored, nonnumeric guidance alone, judges would better justify their sentences. 33 I offer some words of caution for that idea. First, requiring judges to consider broad sentencing principles was unsuccessful before the Guidelines. 34 Second, the Supreme Court already mandated that federal district judges not only calculate and consult the Guidelines but also consider the long-forgotten sentencing maxims in Title 18, United States Code, § 3553(a) . 35 This "factors to be considered when imposing sentence" statute includes non-numeric guidance, such as "the need for the sentence imposed ... to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense."
36 Judges, for the most part, parrot the language of the non-numeric guidance and merely touch the bases to pass appellate review. The federal criminal justice system should maintain the structure, organization, and considerations of the Guidelines, but do away with the distracting and misleading numbers and calculations that accompany the Guidelines. Redacting the numbers and calculations from the Guidelines would provide a middle ground between our current system and Judge Rakoffs proposal. It also would ensure more robust judicial reasoning for an imposed sentence by the district judge.
For example, in a fraud case, Probation would continue to describe the scheme to defraud under the familiar headings, but without the numbers and calculations. The court would pay greater attention to the actual offense conduct organized under the Guidelines' headings, including the dollar amount of the loss, basis of the calculation, number of victims, and the defendant's role in the scheme. District judges have imposed sentences pulling further away from the Guidelines each year since 2005, when the Court decided Booker.37 The numbers and calculations of the Guidelines will carry less and less weight for a sentencing judge as more time passes. Phase out the numbers and calculations now before they represent a functionally irrelevant "anchoring point" for judges at sentencing.l 8 Further, the numbers and calculations of the Guidelines have severely cluttered the appellate courts' true, independent ability to review sentences for reasonableness. A circuit court's substantive "reasonableness" review on appeal has repeatedly turned on the reasonableness of the applicable guideline as much as whether the court's imposed sentence was reasonable. 3 9 If we phase out the numbers and calculations within the Guidelines, then the appellate courts' review and the "reasonableness" standard also will become more robust and meaningful.
B. Provide New, Competing Information
The second solution is to provide district judges with different, competing information to the unhelpful, misleading guidelines. This solution is feasible with a reallocation of resources and attention. Particularly with today's technological advances and the availability oflimitless data, district judges armed with renewed discretion need more and better quality information at sentencing. As set forth below, district judges could be better informed and the goals of sentencing better served with (1) sentencing data reports, (2) searchable, comparable-case databases, and (3) party recommendations and agreements. This information should become part of PSRs and be made available to the sentencing court in addition to the numbers and calculation of the Guidelines. Over time, district courts will pay equal or greater attention to other information at sentencing, like the types discussed below, as compared to the numbers and calculations of Guidelines.
Ill. Proposed New Information at Sentencing
The conversation must progress beyond the tussle over judicial discretion to the resources we devote to informing the court's discretion at sentencing.
A. "Big Data" of Post-Booker Sentencing Statistics
"Big data" is a twenty-first-century term of art that refers to the "tools, processes and procedures allowing an organization to create, manipulate, and manage very large data sets and storage facilities."
40 Many traditional models have been ushered into retirement because of our capability to gather and interpret vast amounts of data. Today, we gather big data on everything and then adapt the way we slice and evaluate the data to our needs. The post-Booker sentencing data, properly gather~d and analyzed, could inform district judges' discretion with real-world, meaningful numbers.
Businesses enhance profits, curb expenses, improve marketing efforts, and optimize customer interaction by processing and interpreting large volumes of data. Even our leisure plans,4' personal fitness , 42 talent predictors in sports, 4 3 and traditional educational systems 4 4 have been forever disrupted 4 5 by those who gather and interpret the available data. Unlike the Guidelines' arbitrary numbers assigned to certain conduct or circumstances, big data allows human behavior to produce empirically justified numbers. Efficient, smart, and successful organizations don't assign arbitrarily created numbers to conduct; instead, they gather and interpret actual data derived from behavior.
In the context of federal sentencing, the Probation Office or some other entity could slice useful data for the court. 46 This does not happen currently, but it could soon. If this data is available already and used so widely elsewhere in business and society, then the federal government should use the information to assist in one of our most important societal determinations, the sentencing of criminal defendants.
B. Comparative Cases, Keywords, and
User-Optimized Results
Next, the Probation Office could provide or make available more user-optimized information to district judges before sentencing. The PSR, a static report developed from other reports, is outdated and lacking functionality. Competitive industry long ago would have organized and made searchable a comparable case analysis from hundreds of similar decisions made each day through the country. Instead, a district judge considers only her own prior cases or, at best, the other judges in the building. More comparable cases could inform the court's discretion at sentencing.
In the age of optimized search results, the judiciary should devote resources to a database capable of geographic, judge-specific, and other "search term" limitations to isolate similar cases. After Booker, the district court ideally should better explain the reasoning underlying its imposed sentences. District judges should benefit from the reasoning offered by their colleagues-and not just the judge down the hall. Each imposed sentence, set of findings, judgment, and sentencing hearing transcript provides numerical information outside of the Guidelines' numbers, coupled with analysis and reasoning. Imagine if one federal court could access a database that captured all post-Booker sentences, logically coded with tags and search terms to facilitate a user-optimized search.
The database, even if not searched by the sentencing judge in a given case, could produce a digest of comparable cases, complete with a summary of the underlying judicial reasoning and charts of the imposed sentences. Conceivably, the database could be closed and available only internally to the network of district judges, and thus, judges could offer additional (internal use only) notes and tags to assist the next judge handing down a sentence to a similarly situated defendant. In a white-collar case, for example, the defendant's applicable guideline may call for [120] [121] [122] [123] [124] [125] [126] [127] [128] [129] [130] [131] [132] months' imprisonment based upon the amount ofloss and niunber of victims. The comparable case database, however, may reveal that in fraud cases with the same loss and number of victims around the country, judges sentenced on average only 65 months' imprisonment and only 14 percent of courts imposed a Guideline sentence, followed by the reasoning of several federal judges. The numbers and rea· soning could truly inform the next judge's discretion.
C. Recommendations or Contractual Agreements of the Parties
Prosecutors, working with the defense, are better positioned to resolve cases and justify fair and reasonable sen· tences than federal district judges. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure n(c)(r) permits prosecutors and counsel for criminal defendants to jointly recommend 48 or contract for a binding or "agreed-upon" sentence. 49 As compared to district judges, the prosecution and defense are in the best position to articulate their justification for a recommendation or an agreed-upon sentence in a written plea agreement and in open court. Yet, the parties rarely use Rule n(c)(r) and, therefore, seldom provide their joint recommendation to district judges. District judges cannot participate in plea discussion~. But the parties may and should negotiate a specific, numerical outcome and communicate it to the court. By comparison, the joint recommendation of the parties controls sentencing in the military justice system. In state court, the parties routinely negotiate and jointly propose sentencing recommendations to the court. Somewhere along the way, the unwritten (and judge-by-judge) rule in most federal courts discouraged federal criminal litigants from doing the same, despite the clear intent of the legislators in Rule n(c)(r).
Most federal sentencing hearings proceed without any joint recommendation or specific agreement from the parties. Many district judges, because of their long struggle for discretion, simply disfavor agreed-upon sentences from the parties. Because defense attorneys would support more joint recommendations and agreements that, by their very nature, fall below the applicable Guideline range, it is the judiciary and the U.S. Department of Justice that stand in the way of the procedural change. DOJ could change this policy immediately with an_Attomey General directive to all prosecutors. The federal judiciary similarly could invite recommendations and agreements in the district "local rules" or local practice.
A district judge should find this information from the parties more meaningful than the distracting and misleading Guidelines. Ironically, the Supreme Court intended the advisory Guidelines to promote judicial discretion to ensure uniform, proportional, and fair punishment. To do so, the district court gives great weight to arbitrary numbers and calculations assigned by a legislatively created agency without regard for individual defendants facing sentencing. The court, at the same time, discourages or wholly rejects agreed-upon input from the government who brought the case to court and the individual facing sentencing. Although joint recommendations and binding plea agree· ments do suffer from some limitations, these tools are far more reliable than the Guideline numbers that currently dominate the sentencing court's attention.
IV. Conclusion
If the goal is better judicial reasoning for federal sentences, then do not force judges to calculate and consider distract· ing and misleading numbers in the Guidelines. We must provide better, competing information-more numeric data, other than the numbers in the Guidelines, as well as searchable, non-numeric description to the courts. With a smart and pointed reallocation of resources, the federal criminal justice system could move away from the arbitrary and unhelpful information provided to judges at sentencing toward useful and meaningful information. REv . 65, 67-70 (2007) (summarizing the ebb and flow of judicial discretion in federal sentencing). Booker, 543 U.S. at 233 (holding that the once-mandatory guidelines would be relegated to "advisory"). /d. at 245-46 (setting out the new process of federal sentencing with "advisory guidel ines," whereby the district court must continue to calculate, settle objections under, and "consider" the Guidelines ("[T] he key determinant of a white-collar criminal defendant's sentence is the amount of the loss."). See infra note 8 (Keynote) (comparing a particularly "evil" offender who targeted widows at a lesser loss total against a less immoral higher loss defendant). Judge Rakoff called the reliance on loss amounts to drive sentencing as "kind of nuts."
As referenced throughout this article, Judge Rakoff del ivered the keynote address at the 27th Annual National Institute on White Collar Crime in Las Vegas on March 7, 2013 [hereinafter, Keynote] . Judge Rakoff's Keynote is revised and printed in th is Issue. (Jed S. Rakoff, Why Federal Sentencing Guidelines Should Be Scrapped, 26 FED . SENT . REP . 6 (2013) .) Judge Rakoff described his frustration with the Guidelines, as a set of numbers "drawn from nowhere" that continue to steer most federal judges 1m posing criminal sentences. See 18 REv. 639, 640--41 (2008) (stating that "the Commission has attempted to strip prosecutors of a power they have had for more than half a century"-the power to negotiate and enter into meaningful plea agreements S. 361, 364 (1989) ("Congress delegated almost unfettered discretion to the sentencing JUdge to determine a convicted defendant's sentence, but a review of the legislative history strongly suggests that the sentencing disparity that Congress hoped to eliminate did not stem from prosecutorial discretion, but
